Earlier today, I read an article about the plethora of information security breaches in recent history. Its title reads:
“We take security seriously”, otherwise known as “We didn’t take it seriously enough”
The article then lists a number of companies informing the public that they've been breached.
I think this article doesn't just blame the victims of those attacks, but subjects them to public ridicule. Neither helps anyone, least of all end users.
I'm surprised to hear such comments from Troy Hunt. He's certainly an accomplished professional with extensive security experience. This is not the first time people have expressed similar thoughts; the HN thread for that article is rife with them.
The explicit assumption is that these companies wouldn't have gotten in trouble if only they had taken security more seriously. In a world where the information services store is increasingly valuable and software increasingly complex, breaches are going to happen. The idea that getting breached is their own darn fault is unrealistic.
This idea is also counterproductive. Firstly, there's one thing all of the victims being ostracized have in common: they disclosed the details of the breach. That is exactly what they should have done; punishing them creates a perverse incentive for victims to hide breaches in the future, a decidedly worse end-user outcome.
Secondly, if any breach is as bad as any other breach, there is no incentive to proactively mitigate damage from future breaches by hardening internal systems. Why encrypt records, invest in access control or keep sensitive information in a separate database with extensive audit logging? It might materially impact end-user security, but who cares -- all anyone is going to remember is that you got popped.
Finally, there's a subtle PR issue: how can the security industry build deep relationships with clients when we publicly ridicule them when the inevitable happens?
These commentators have presumably not been the victims of a breach themselves. I have trouble swallowing that anyone who's been through the terrifying experience of being breached, seeing a breach up close or even just witnessing a hairy situation being defused could air those thoughts.
If you haven't been the victim of an attack, and feel that your security posture is keeping you from becoming one, consider this:
- What's your threat model?
- How confident are you in your estimation of the capabilities of attackers?
- Would you still be okay if your database became three orders of magnitude more valuable? Most personal data's value will scale linearly with the number of people affected, so if you're a small start-up with growth prospects, you'll either fail to execute, or be subject to that scenario.
- Would you still be okay if the attacker has a few 0-days?
- What if the adversary is a nation-state?
- How do you know you haven't been breached?
That brings me to my final thesis: I contest the claim that all of the companies in the article didn't take security seriously. It is far more probable that all of the companies cited in the article have expended massive efforts to protect themselves, and, in doing so, foiled many attacks. It's also possible that they haven't; but the onus there is certainly on the accuser.
Clearly, that's a weak form of disagreement, since "taking something seriously" is entirely subjective. However, keep in mind that many targets actually haven't taken security seriously, and would not even have the technical sophistication to detect an attack.
(By the way, if you too would like to help materially improve people's
security, we're hiring. Contact me at